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In the spring of 1999, Professor Thomas Lyon of the Universityof Southern California Law School published a lengthy lawreview article in which he argued that the introduction into
evidence of research on the suggestibility of child witnesses was
not of assistance to triers of fact.1 Lyon’s article has found its way
into judicial training packets and has been posted to electronic
bulletin boards sponsored by organizations with interest in cus-
tody evaluations, psychology and law, and related topics. Because
judges are soon likely to encounter arguments based upon Lyon’s
article, I wish to alert judges to what I believe to be significant
fallacies in his critique of children’s suggestibility research.
Lyon is critical of what he refers to as the “new wave in chil-
dren’s suggestibility research.” As the term is used by Lyon, the
new wave refers to a body of research conducted by Stephen
Ceci, Maggie Bruck, and others.2 It is my contention that the
new-wave research has added much to our earlier understanding
of memory processes. The professional recognition that the new-
wave researchers have received suggests that the contribution
made by their work to our understanding of children’s sug-
gestibility has been widely appreciated. 
Although Stephen Ceci, the developmental psychology pro-
fessor who has spearheaded research in this area, and law pro-
fessor Richard Friedman have already responded to Lyon’s cri-
tique,3 my perspective on this matter is somewhat different and,
I believe, much like a judge’s might be. I am not a researcher—
rather, I am a “consumer” of research data. For 15 years, I have
been a court-appointed evaluator of comparative custodial suit-
ability; in that capacity, I have encountered a significant number
of abuse allegations. Knowledge of the cognitive dynamics
demonstrated in the new-wave research has been helpful to me
on many occasions. It is for this reason that I believe it to be
information of potential use to triers of fact.
Lyon’s primary criticisms are: (1) that the new-wave
researchers have overstated the frequency with which suggestive
questioning occurs and, in their proposals for methodological
changes, have failed to address the risk that abusers will be
acquitted; (2) that new-wave research conditions have failed to
replicate real-world phenomena closely enough, thereby mak-
ing it unreasonable to presume that we have gained meaningful
knowledge of the real-world phenomena through the research
on their artificial analogues; (3) that Maggie Bruck in particular
has erred in statements made during testimony and that her
decision to offer didactic as opposed to case-specific testimony
is flawed; and, finally, (4) that jurors are already aware that chil-
dren are suggestible and that testimony concerning the new-
wave research causes jurors to overestimate the probability that
testimony from a particular child witness has been distorted by
suggestive questioning.
HOW SERIOUS IS THE PROBLEM?
Though Lyon asserts in his opening that the new-wave
researchers assume that highly suggestive interviewing tech-
niques are the norm, he later acknowledges that Ceci and Bruck
have alerted their readers to the possibility that materials
reviewed by them may not be representative. The various
researchers mentioned by Lyon are surely aware that where their
involvement has been sought it was because someone believed
that the interviews being brought to their attention were con-
ducted improperly. There is no basis for suggesting either that
the researchers are unaware that they have been examining an
unrepresentative sample of interview transcripts or that they
have endeavored to conceal this fact from their readers.
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On the Importance of
Suggestibility Research in
Assessing the Credibility of
Children’s Testimony
David A. Martindale
As we contemplate the relative risks associated with different
interview techniques, we must be mindful of the fact that some
of the emotional distress experienced by children involved in
sexual-abuse investigations is attributable to the methods we
employ in the course of our interactions with them. It is, I
believe, recognized that some children are unable to ascertain
the difference between events that have actually occurred and
events about which they have been involved in detailed discus-
sions. It is, therefore, likely that in our well-intentioned (but
sometimes incompetent) attempts to protect children, we have
left some nonabused children with memories of abuse that, in
fact, never occurred.
Unfortunately, there is no foundation for the sanguine view
held by some that the practitioners whose tactics have been dis-
credited in highly publicized cases represent a small minority of
the mental health professionals who have become involved in
evaluating children believed to have been the victims of sexual
abuse. In a study of appellate court decisions handed down in
sex-abuse cases between 1980 and 1990, it was found that 46% of
the interviewing experts had been treating the child who was the
focus of the case.4 Within the mental-health professions there is
general agreement that the performance of each activity (con-
ducting therapy and  conducting a forensic assessment for the
purpose of formulating an objective professional opinion with
respect to abuse) compromises one’s effectiveness in the perfor-
mance of the other activity.5 The presence among the testifying
experts of so many treating practitioners suggests that many of
the mental-health professionals who have been performing inves-
tigations of alleged sexual abuse are not among those who are
familiar with generally accepted standards of practice. 
IS THE NEW-WAVE RESEARCH APPLICABLE TO 
REAL-WORLD CASES?
An assessment of the applicability of research to a particular
case must be based upon the amount of overlap between the
characteristics of the situations created by researchers and the
characteristics of the real-world situation that is the focus of the
case. To borrow from the Supreme Court’s ruling in Daubert v.
Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc.,6 vigorous cross-examination
and the introduction into evidence of opposing views are the
traditional means by which to address such issues. 
It is Lyon’s position that if children are suggestible, they are
also counter-suggestible and that false allegations arising from
leading questions can be ferreted out through effective cross-
examination. He cites data from a study in which an attempt
was made to convince three and four year olds that they had
witnessed the theft of money from a purse. According to Lyon,
under cross-examination only one of the five children main-
tained that he had witnessed the theft. This finding does not
persuade me that suggestive
interviewing is a tactic the conse-
quences of which are minimal. 
Few would argue that some
very serious errors have been
made in some high-profile cases.
In discussions of the new-wave
research and its applicability,
attention frequently shifts to the
case of State v. Michaels,7 a case in
which the investigative tech-
niques employed by Eileen
Treacy, the state’s expert, were
criticized in an amicus brief sub-
mitted by Ceci, Bruck, and 43
other researchers.8 The New
Jersey Supreme Court declared
that no amount of cross-examina-
tion could have undone the harm
caused by Treacy’s interviews.
Lyon implies that cases like the Michaels case are to unpubli-
cized evaluations as airplane crashes are to routine air travel. He
seems to suggest that, for that reason, our energy is misdirected
when we scrutinize such cases.  While I acknowledge my lack of
expertise in the area of flight safety, it is my impression that in
its examination of disasters, the NTSB frequently uncovers prob-
lems the solutions to which make day-to-day air travel relatively
uneventful, as we wish it to be.
IS MAGGIE BRUCK DOING IT RIGHT?
Lyon has faulted Bruck for offering didactic testimony with-
out familiarizing herself with case-specific details and has criti-
cized her testimony in two particular cases. The offering of
expert testimony intended to educate triers of fact concerning
phenomena with which they may be insufficiently knowledge-
able is generally considered to be among the most useful of the
types of testimony offered by mental-health professionals. Such
testimony provides a context within which evidence can be eval-
uated.  The applicability of the anticipated framework testimony
can be considered in pretrial proceedings, can be alluded to in a
judge’s instructions to a jury, and can be contemplated by the
jurors. Though Lyon suggests that Bruck’s desire to simply func-
tion as an educator is inappropriate, many seasoned experts
would endorse her position. Immersing oneself in case-specific
details can compromise one’s objectivity.
Though experts are reasonably expected to be effective com-
municators, an analysis of an expert’s testimony provides more
information about the expert’s performance under pressure than
it does about the expert’s findings, theories, and conclusions.
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When we prepare our thoughts for publication, we choose our
words with care: we have ample time in which to review and
contemplate what we have written; we are able to obtain input
from respected colleagues; and, when our words appear in print,
we are not required to disclose how many drafts we discarded.
When offering testimony, the situation, as we are all well aware,
is quite different. An accurate picture of a researcher’s position
with respect to her own work or the work of others is better
obtained by examining the researcher’s writings than by review-
ing transcripts of her testimony in the course of an emotionally
charged trial.
TESTIMONY CONCERNING NEW-WAVE RESEARCH:
PREJUDICIAL OR PROBATIVE?
Ascertaining what evidence has been critical in juror decision
making is not as simple as it might appear. Even if we presume
that jurors endeavor to be forthright when responding to
inquiries concerning the manner in which they arrived at their
decisions, the best they can do is share with us those aspects of
their decision making of which they are aware. Even among
trained professionals, decision making can be influenced by fac-
tors of which we are not consciously aware.9
Even undisputed facts can, under certain circumstances, be
more prejudicial than probative. Lyon correctly calls attention
to the fact that when asked to estimate the frequency with
which an event occurs, individuals conduct a mental search for
instances of that event. Our estimate of the frequency is strongly
influenced by the number of and/or the impact of examples that
come to mind. To illustrate, ever since the May 1979 disappear-
ance of Etan Patz  on his first unaccompanied two-block walk
from home to school, child abduction has received widespread
publicity. It is likely that people asked to quantify various risks
to the health and well-being of children would overestimate the
incidence of abduction—particularly by strangers.
In an apparent endeavor to minimize the importance of sug-
gestive interviewing techniques, Lyon cites studies from which
the data indicate that approximately 10% of interviewers’ ques-
tions are suggestive. The deleterious effect of one strong sug-
gestion from an authoritative source is not likely to be dimin-
ished simply because it is followed by numerous non-suggestive
questions. Thus, we should endeavor to ascertain the percentage
of interviews that are undistorted by any suggestive questions.
That figure would have more meaning.
It has been well established that a proffer of evidence must be
accompanied by confirmation of its authenticity. It must be
shown that it is what it is presented as being. If the prosecution
wishes to introduce testimony concerning what is purported to
be a memory of an actual event, the defense should be afforded
the opportunity to question the authenticity of the memory.
SHOULD NEW-WAVE RESEARCH GUIDE 
POLICY MAKING?
Lyon argues that we should not permit our concern with
regard to tactics such as those of Eileen Treacy to influence pol-
icy decisions that might set standards for all child interviews. As
we consider whether or not we should permit our discomfort
concerning one evaluator’s actions in one case to influence pol-
icy decisions, we should bear in mind that the Michaels case was
neither Eileen Treacy’s first case nor was it her last. Treacy func-
tioned as the state’s expert in many uncomplicated cases that
were adjudicated without fanfare and without offsetting expert
testimony concerning the new-wave research. It would be naive
to presume that the methods employed by her in the Michaels
case were unique to that case. 
Lyon suggests that investigators must move beyond open-
ended questions when asking young children about possible
abuse because of the powerful disincentives to disclosure.
Accused felons, when being interrogated by police, are strongly
motivated not to confess. Should we, therefore, accept the use
by police officers of coercive tactics when they are confident that
the individual being questioned is guilty?
Lyon opines that the interview strategy changes suggested by
the new-wave researchers would hamper the detection of true
cases of abuse. Those who share Lyon’s concern might consider
the arguments that were mounted against Miranda warnings.
There was widespread concern that advising individuals of their
rights prior to questioning them would alter the interrogation
process in such a way as to make it more difficult to gather evi-
dence, secure indictments, and prosecute wrongdoers. We have
lived with the terms of the Miranda decision since 1966 and I
believe it safe to say that our country is comfortable with the
concept.
While accepting the validity of one of Lyon’s concerns (that
testimony concerning the new-wave research may cause juror’s
to overestimate its importance in evaluating the testimony of a
particular child witness), it remains my strongly held view that
the probative value of such testimony far outweighs any preju-
dicial effect that it might cause.
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